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Zusammenfassung
Dieser Aufsatz behandelt die Entwicklung besonders umweltbelastender Branchen seit 1970.
Untersucht werden 11 Grundstoffindustrien, die Elektrizitätserzeugung sowie der Straßen-
güterverkehr in 32 Industrieländern. Als nötig erweist sich dabei eine ökologische Industrie-
politik, da alle anderen Versuche, die Umweltbelastung in Industrieländern zu vermindern –
nachsorgender Umweltschutz, Auslagerung in Länder der Dritten Welt, intersektoraler Struk-
turwandel und ökologische Modernisierung ohne staatliche Einflußnahme –, bislang lediglich
Teilerfolge verzeichneten und die Probleme der ”dirty industries” letztlich nicht lösen
konnten.
Summary
This article concerns itself with the environmental role of heavily polluting industries since
1970, analysing its development in 11 basic industries, as well as electricity production and
road transport, in 32 industrial countries. It argues for a green industrial policy, demonstrating
that other mitigations of environmental pressure in industrial countries – end-of-pipe treat-
ment, relocation to the Third World, structural change in the industrial sector and even envi-
ronmentally oriented modernisation – have so far been unable to solve the problems of “dirty
industries”, although some approaches have shown (some) promise.
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Industry in general is seen as an important factor contributing to environmental stress, but in
point of fact it is a relatively small area of industrial production – mainly raw materials proc-
essing and energy production – which places the largest burden on the environment. This
“dirty industry” sector has been the main target of environmental policy, and hopes that its
ecological problems could be solved have been  to some extent borne out by the solutions
available now.
Firstly, hopes were based on the effects of traditional pollution control, i.e. end-of-pipe
treatment. This strategy has led to notable improvements, but after a while the limitations of
filters, waste water treatment plants and the like became apparent: waste disposal problems
persist, economic growth leads to new increases in emissions, problems are shifted intermedi-
ally or intertemporally, rather than being solved. For some environmental problems (for ex-
ample the emission of greenhouse gases such as CO2 or methane) there are no end-of-pipe
techniques available, and the results of material flow analysis have made it clear that many
problems (resources, storage, transportation, land-use, dissipative losses, etc.) at all stages of
the production chain remain unsolved.
Another possibility for reducing the ecological burden of heavily polluting industries in i-
dustrial countries seemed to be relocation to developing countries or a change in the global
division of labour (cf. Low/Yeats 1992, Stevens 1993).
A third possible solution is presented by structural change, reducing the importance of the
heaviest polluters by reducing demand, or by modernisation in the sectors using inputs of
these industries (Jänicke 1984, Ayres / Simonis 1994, Schmidt-Bleek 1993, v. Weizsäcker
1994). The theory that the more advanced countries are moving “beyond the era of materials”
(Larson et al. 1986) offered hope in this direction.
The fourth possible solution to the ecological problems of heavily polluting industries is
their own ecological modernisation (Jä icke 1984, Zimmermann et al. 1990). By ecological
modernisation we mean a strategy for improving the environment by reducing the intensity
(measured against value added) of use of materials, water, land and transportation, and the
relative degree of risk brought by technological (or organisational) innovation. All of these are
strongly influenced by the type and scale of major material flows.
Leaving aside the well-known end-of-pipe solution (which is now standard in most indus-
trial countries) we would now like to discuss these three other possibilities.
We should first make clear what we mean by “dirty” industries. The main polluters among
manufacturing industries are the producers of paper and paperboard, petroleum products, pri-
mary metals, stone, clay, glass and chemicals. These sectors have received by far the largest
share of pollution control investment in (West) German and US manufacturing industry (Lu-
2cas et al. 1992, 83), a clear indicator of their high environmental impact (Low/Yeats 1992,
91), but there are other environmentally important characteristics here. In (West) Germany,
the aforementioned sectors accounted for 73% of the energy consumption, 83% of the water
consumption and 49% of the solid waste generation of all manufacturing industry in the late
eighties (Jänicke et al. 1993, 71, 83 ff.). Outside the manufacturing sector, electricity produc-
tion, mining and road transport at the very least must also be added to the list of heavy pollut-
ers. In this context, “dirty industries” may be described as forms of production which cause
above-average environmental stress even with the use of end-of-pipe treatment. We will call
this “structural pollution”.
Table 1: Indicators Analysed, Sources
Aluminium (PP) Aluminium, primary production Metallgesellschaft
Cement (P) Cement production UN
Chlorine (P) Chlorine production UN
Copper (P) Copper, refined production Metallgesellschaft
Crude Steel (P) Crude steel production UN / UNCTAD
Fertilizer (P) Phosphate, potash and nitrogen fertilizers FAO
Lead (Ref. P) Lead, refined production Metallgesellschaft
Paper/-board (P) Paper and paperboard production FAO
Pesticides (P) Insecticides, herbicides and fungicides productionUN
Petrol. Products (P) Petroleum products OECD
Zinc (P) Zinc, smelter production Metallgesellschaft
Electricity (P) Electricity production IEA
Freight Movement (Road)Freight transport in tkm UN / ECE / IRF / UIC
GDP Gross domestic product (constant (1980) Dollar)OECD / CIA
We propose to analyse development in these sectors, with the exception of mining, in 32 in-
dustrial countries since 1970, using physical (as opposed to monetary) data to describe the
total, or at least typical output of the above-mentioned sectors (see Table 1). Our intention
thereby is to find empirical answers to the following questions:
· Has the relocation of dirty industries to developing countries contributed, so far, to a
reduction in structural pollution in industrial countries (Section 2)?
· What role has been played by ecological restructuring (intersectoral change), here the
decline of heavily polluting industries (Section 3)?
· Has ecological modernisation within heavily polluting industries (intrasectoral change)
been a relevant factor (Section 4)?
Taking everything into account, the results are disappointing and so we come to the conclu-
sion (Section 5) that a “green” industrial policy is necessary (Jänicke et al. 1987, UNIDO
1991, RWI 1992, RWI/DIW 1993; see also e.g. Krelle 1989, Audretsch 1991, Beirat 1991,
Klepsch et al. 1994).
32. Have Dirty Industries been Relocated to Developing Countries?
The opinion that the wealthier countries of the world tend to solve some of their envi-
ronmental problems by relocating basic polluter industries to developing countries is widely
held (see e.g. Mármora 1992, George 1992, Narr / Schubert 1994). But is this the case? Or, if
indeed “pollution intensity grew rapidly in developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s
... have they migrated, in the displacement sense?” (Low 1992: 3). This surely cannot be true
for electricity production and road transport, and it is also hardly likely in the case of cement
production, because of transport costs, but what about other polluting industries?
2.1 Empirical Data on North-South Trade
Developing countries’ (in the main, newly industrialised countries like Brazil or South Korea)
increasing share in world production of, or trade in, certain goods is sometimes taken to illus-
trate a tendency towards relocation. But if, as a consequence of industrialisation in the South,
their share of consumption is increasing similarly, this does not indicate a change in the global
division of labour. Even if production is growing faster than consumption in developing
countries, the Third World might not necessarily have become a haven for the world’s pollut-
ers; this could also be due to the effect of import substitution in some developing countries.
Nevertheless, there could still be positive side-effects for the environments of high-income
countries.
One possibility for testing this hypothesis of relocation or displacement is an analysis of the
balance of trade in the industrial countries. For this, we have divided net exports (exports mi-
nus imports) of the aforementioned basic materials by domestic consumption in the highly
industrialised market economies (i.e. OECD members without Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portu-
gal, Turkey and Mexico). In addition, we will discuss the respective net export/consumption
ratios for all industrial countries, i.e. all OECD members (except Mexico) and the former so-
cialist states in Europe. Generally, the poorer OECD countries play a negligible role in these
trade balances.
The advanced industrialised countries export large, and continually increasing amounts of
fertilisers (cf. fig. 1), in both absolute terms and as a percentage of domestic consumption1.
The main producers are Canada and, since the mid-eighties, the USA. Net export/consumption
ratios for the former socialist countries have remained almost unchanged, the Soviet Union
being the main exporter. While it is true that the import dependency of developing countries
actually declined, this is due to the fact that fertiliser consumption in developing countries is
                                                
1 The outlier for 1974/75 is probably the result of missing import data: in this year the reported world produc-
tion of fertilisers was 13.4% (11 Mio. t) higher than reported world consumption. For later years this apparent
surplus production amounted to only 4% of reported consumption.
4today roughly twenty (!) times higher than in 1960, and while imports from indust ialised
countries as a share of developing countries’ co sumption has fallen from seventy-five to
twenty-five percent, there has been no export into industrialised countries.
The rich countries continued to produce more wood pulp, paper and paperboard than
they consumed, but the resulting exports were hardly significant. Production is concentrated
strongly in the USA, Canada, Sweden and Finland, where three quarters of OECD wood pulp
and nearly two thirds of its paper and paperboard is produced. Again, the former socialist
countries hardly participated in foreign trade.
Despite well-known successes in some newly-industrialised countries, the highly industri-
alised countries’ xport dependency in crude steel has declined only slightly in recent years,
after a sharp rise in the mid-seventies. Most important are Japan’s (slowly declining) net ex-
ports, without which the highly industrialised countries’ mbin d balance of trade would be
zero, owing to the US importing roughly the same amount as Europe exports. The participa-
tion of the former socialist economies in world crude steel trade was insignificant.
When discussing the more heterogeneous group of non-ferr us metals, we should bear in
mind the relatively low economic importance of these materials when compared to crude
steel. The more advanced OECD countries produced more zinc and l ad in the eighties than
they used (fig. 1). Some other non-ferrous metals – especially tin, copper and nickel – are
mostly smelted and refined in those countries which have their own metal ore resources (fig.
2)- The net import shares of these metals are therefore large in the wealthier countries (80-
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5100% of domestic tin consumption, about 30% for nickel and copper). The presence of baux-
ite deposits is however relatively unimportant as regards the production location for the most
important non-ferrous metal – primary aluminium: crucial in this case is a supply of cheap
energy, such as hydroelectric power. Encouraged by the oil crises, primary aluminium pro-
duction has become more and more concentrated in countries where electricity is particularly
inexpensive, such as Canada, Australia, Norway and Brazil. The trend in Japan, a country with
high electricity prices, has been extraordinary. By the time of the first oil crisis, Japan had
achieved complete self-sufficiency in aluminium production – and that with neither bauxite
deposits nor any important domestic energy resources! But then, in 1978, primary aluminium
production was abolished by law, and the material was henceforth imported, although recy-
cling increased remarkably.  The other OECD countries are net exporters. Net imports from
all OECD members were as high as net exports from the former socialist economies (mostly
the Soviet Union). Only in 1982-89 was there a 5% deficit (as a share of domestic consump-
tion in all OECD and former socialist countries).
The western industrialised economies, mainly Japan and West Germany, imported petro-
leum products to a small extent (according to IEA calculations), but taken together with that
of the eastern industrial economies, trade was balanced by immense Soviet exports. In the
past there has also been no long-term tendency towards rising import dependency in the
highly developed countries.
The general tendency has therefore been not towards relocation of “dir y” basic in-
dustries to developing countries. The high-income market economies have remained net
exporters of fertiliser, paper and pulp, crude steel, lead and zinc, where the net export share in
fertiliser, crude steel, lead and zinc is today even higher than it was twenty years ago. The net
imports of petroleum products and primary aluminium were balanced by net exports from the
Soviet Union (not from developing countries). Rises in net imports from developing countries
could only be found in copper, nickel and tin.
Of course, these empirical findings relate only to possible relocation of highly polluting
sub-sectors of the economy. Not included in the data are materials that are not directly traded,
but used by producer countries themselves for the production of finished or semi-finished
goods, such as machines, cars, even services, which may then be exported. It would be logi-
cally possible to hypothesise a country which neither produces nor imports basic materials,
which is completely dependent on foreign industry, and which consequently imports large
quantities of final products, but this is not plausible in the case of highly industrialised coun-
tries.  On the other hand, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to measure the content
of direct or indirect material and energy use in world trade with any acceptable reliability. We
have therefore only checked whether relocation has taken place within heavily polluting basic
industries to a greater extent than within other manufacturing sectors, and evidence of this oft-
asserted tendency could not be found. According to Low and Yeats, some developing coun-
6tries’ share of exports from heavily polluting industries has grown. But in 1988 the industrial-
ised countries still accounted for three quarters of world exports in this sector, the EEC for
40% (Low/Yeats 1992: 92 ff.)!
We are not concerned here with the migration of heavy polluter industries and/or the re-
spective change in the division of labour within the industrialised world. This is indeed an
important trend, and it will be discussed in section 3.
2.2 Why Dirty Industries Are Seldom Relocated to Developing Countries
Should these results be considered surprising? After all, one assumes that pollution control is
complicated and expensive, and that poorer societies are inclined to accept far less pollution
control than richer ones. Why indeed do the most heavily polluting sectors not seek shelter
from the protests of the rich in the slums of the poor?
In the first place, the costs of pollution control should not be overestimated (cf. OECD
1992, RWI/DIW 1993): even with respect to heavily polluting industries, pollution control
costs hardly more than 3% of total output (Lucas et al. 1992), and most of these costs are a
necessary condition for any proper operation. In the light of the differences – in the cost of
labour, capital and transactions, and in political and economical risk – between developing
and highly developed economies, the role of lower environmental standards, if there is one,
can be only minor (Straubhaar / Wyss 1994).
When these other differences are taken into account, the industries analysed above can
scarcely be identified as promising candidates for relocation. They are highly capital-intensive
and require much professional skills (see e.g. Brown/McKern 1987), two factors generally
considered to be the main obstacles to the development of self-reliance in the Third World.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that industrialised countries would threaten the competitiveness
of their domestic industries by introducing strict environmental regulation. There is – not least
in the basic industries – a tendency to abandon environmental protection measures as soon as
jobs are at stake. In the face of a major economic threat, either the demand for more effective
pollution control is reduced, or subsidies and market regulations are introduced to assist the
needy polluters. This form of subsidy has attracted criticism on both economic and environ-
mental grounds.
There are good arguments for moving production to parts of the South where demand is
rising. But this leaves unanswered the question of whether a general relocation of heavy pol-
luters to developing countries could reduce the pressure – and capacity – for innovation,
which is particularly important in this industrial sector. A slowdown in innovation would ac-
tually increase global pressure on the environment.
73. Have Dirty Industries Declined as a Result of Structural Change?
Structural change is a permanent concomitant to economic development. Given the tremen-
dous variation in the pollution intensities of different economic sectors, structural change may
have important consequences for the environment, in the long run at any rate. Many observers
predict long-term structural changes which may have positive side-effects for the environment
(section 3.1). To what extent is this borne out by structural changes to date?
First we will analyse the trends within individual industries in all industrialised countries
(section 3.2), and then we will turn to the patterns of change in individual countries for our
selection of industries (section 3.3).
3.1 Theories of Ecologically Significant Structural Change
Goldemberg et al. (1988, 96-98) – following Larson et al. (1986) – have remarked on “a
broad-based trend away from basic materials use in the economy” of highly developed coun-
tries. This is in line with earlier contributions from Malenbaum (1973, 1978; see also CEQ /
Department of State 1980). The core of their argument is the hypothesis that long-term life
cycles of materials such as steel, ammonia, cement, aluminium, chlorine and paper lead first
to a reduced significance to GDP for materials, and finally to an absolute decline in material
consumption. The authors showed that, generally starting with the first oil crisis in 1973, there
has been a decline, in Germany, France and the UK, in per capita consumption of steel, ce-
ment and ammonia, and a stagnation in consumption of the others. In the US this tendency
appeared even more widspread.
Several factors may contribute to such a long-term decline in material intensity:
· the gradually increasing importance of the service sector, and the corresponding decrease in
the manufacturing sector’s share of GDP;
· the rise of “post-materialism” and changes in consumer behaviour in advanced societies
(Inglehart 1989), which has, among other things, led to an increase in the perceived im-
portance of non-material aspects of consumption, where the value, even of industrial
goods, is increasingly based on qualities such as durability, individuality, design, techno-
logical sophistication and, last but not least, low environmental impact;
· the declining demand within processing industries for basic materials (increased material
productivity), due to cost-reducing modernisation (for example energy efficiency, waste r-
duction), and assisted by the change from mass production to more flexible and specialised
forms of production (Piore/Sabel 1984);
· the decrease in material intensity of the basic industries themselves (increased value added
per unit weight of output), through for example improvements in steel quality
(McSweeny/Hirosako 1991).
8In addition to this, partial substitution of some of the basic materials analysed has taken place:
· petroleum products by other energy sources, such as natural gas or nuclear energy,
· metals by plastics (and other metals).
Finally, the aforementioned trend may have been strengthened for a time by some more tem-
porary factors:
· the tremendous (but only partially long-lasting) rise in world oil prices;
· the sharp reduction in investment during periods of over-capacity, following unexpectedly
low rates of GDP growth in the wake of the two oil crises and the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system. This resulted in a fall in demand for machines and buildings, correspond-
ingly reducing consumption of cement, metals and other durable materials, as well as of
energy.
3.2 Product-specific Patterns of Change
Economic development in the industrialised world in the last two decades has been character-
ised to a great extent by these trends. But is this sufficient justification for hypothesising the
“end of the era of materials”? From an environmental perspective, the results are somewhat
disappointing.
Production of cement, crude steel, fertilisers and petroleum products in the more advanced
industrial countries has indeed generally decreased. However, the less developed industrial
countries of Eastern and Southern Europe have experienced a broad increase (in the case of
the eastern countries, up to the late eighties). This two-tier structure within the industrial
world can also be found to apply to some environmental pollutants and to industry’s energy
and water consumption (Jänicke 1996).
The most extreme case in our selection of dirty industries is cement production (fig. 3).
Here the trend in advanced countries has been quite different to that within other countries: we
found drastically declining production, while cement production in Eastern and Southern
Europe was rising faster than GDP. We have the impression that the data on GDP for the for-
mer socialist countries (which are based principally on official US statistics) tend to overstate
substantially their wealth. Given more realistic data, the difference between rich and poor
countries in fig. 3 would in all probability be even more impressive. The only high-income
countries to show rising cement production have been Japan and Italy, while production in
Canada and Australia has remained more or less stable. In most other advanced industrial
countries, however, production has decreased, most markedly in Scandinavia – production in
Norway has fallen by 50%! As a result, there is no difference today between rich and poor
countries in per capita cement production, although variations within group  are remarkable
(per capita production in Japan, for example, is three times higher than in Great Britain).
9In contrast to the above-mentioned “structural improvements”, production by other heavy
polluters – paper, chlorine, aluminium, pesticides, electricity and road transport (measured in
tonnes-kilometres) – has steadily increased from an already high base, although a sharply
negative trend in chlorine production has recently become apparent in some countries (Scan-
FIG. 3:  CEMENT PRODUCTION (kg per capita)
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FIG. 4:  PAPER AND PAPERBOARD PRODUCTION (kg per capita)
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dinavia, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy). These industries are more regionally con-
centrated than the “traditional” group mentioned above, which is mostly a result of natural
competitive advantages such as forestation or cheap hydroelectric power.
Paper and paperboard production is presented in fig. 4 as an example of the more success-
ful “dirty” industries. The specialisation in paper production is worthy of note, where Scandi-
navia, Austria and North America, due to their rich forest resources, are preeminent. With the
exception of the British Isles, not a single country shows a trend towards declining production
– on the whole, production increases in step with overall growth in GDP.
To sum up, a general decline of heavily polluting industries has not so far become evident
in the industrial countries.
3.3 Country-specific Patterns of Change
Although from the oil crisis of 1973 until 1992, at least half of the 32 industrial countries un-
der examination experienced a lower rate of growth in most “dirty” industries than in overall
GDP, not one country has experienced an absolute decline of the majority of the industries
examined here.
A relative structural improvement (d -linking of the majority of highly polluting industries
from growth in GDP) was found in the cases of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the UK and the USA. Its
importance is best expressed negatively however: without it, the environmental situation
would have been even worse.
The data for the US offer only partial confirmation of the “trend away from basic materials
use” (Goldemberg et al. 1988: 96). This is the case in crude steel, aluminium and cement pro-
duction, but there was a revival in production of materials such as chlorine and fertiliser in the
late eighties. Paper and paperboard production has increased consistently.
The case of Japan is particularly interesting (fig. 5). Its relative improvement up to the mid-
eighties was the most impressive within the OECD. Not one “dirty” industry grew signifi-
cantly faster than GDP. The growth rates in electricity and chlorine production were much the
same as that of GDP, as were those in paper and paperboard production and road haulage (af-
ter a sharp decline in 1972-76), while production of all other materials hardly rose above 1970
levels (petroleum products, crude steel, zinc, lead) or their levels in the late seventies (copper
and cement). A revival in some of the heavy polluters has taken place since 1986/7, most no-
tably in cement and petroleum products (Jänicke et al. 1993, 1993a, Foljanty-Jost 1995).
In the context of the reasons for declining material intensity (of GDP) given above, Japan is of
special interest:
11
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years, Japan has been
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· GDP growth and in-
vestment (the share of
GNP used for invest-
ment) in Japan were
the highest in the in-
dustrial world.
Thus the (relative) de-
materialisation in Japan was the result neither of post-materialism nor de-industrialisation, but
of a fast-growing and highly flexible industrial sector under pressure from rising energy prices
and a heavy dependency on imports of raw materials (for the flexibility of the Japanese econ-
omy, especially of small and mediu -sized enterprises, see Friedman 1988).
This is no argument in favour of economic growth, however. In countries like West Ger-
many, the overall reduction in material intensity was much smaller, but weaker growth in
GDP made possible an absolute fall in the use of some of the most important materials,
whereas in Japan this effect was neutralised by high economic growth. Differences in growth
rates are therefore highly important in determining the environmental effects of indus-
trial change.
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The trend in Germany –
as in most other indus-
trial countries – has been
far more heterogeneous
than in Japan (fig. 6). A
decrease, in absolute
terms, in crude steel, fer-
tiliser, petroleum prod-
ucts, cement and lead
production was partly
offset by rapid growth in
production of aluminium,
chlorine, paper and pa-
perboard and pesticides.
However, the late eight-
ies saw the beginnings of




cially chlorine) have also




ration took place in many
Eastern and Southern European countries (Portugal, Yugoslavia and the former COMECON
countries in Eastern Europe) until the late eighties, as  the majority of highly polluting indus-
tries grew faster than GDP. A structural deterioration was also in evidence in New Zealand
(for similar trends in developing countries see also Hettige et al. 1992, Reed 1992, Paulus
1993).
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To take Greece as an
example, industries
which tended to decline
in the more advanced
countries – cement, fer-
tiliser, crude steel and
petroleum products –
grew faster than GDP
(fig. 7). This was mainly
due to sharp increases in
production in the seven-




The sharp rise in pesti-
cide production should
not be overstressed, as
the level of production is
still very low (0.65 kg
per capita in 1990, com-
pared with e.g. 2.50
kg/cap in Portugal or




interesting form of structural change. After Stalin’s death in 1953 there had been much criti-
cism of the leading economic role played by heavy industry, or the “tonnage id ology”. And
since the late seventies there has been much criticism, sometimes on environmental grounds,
of the sluggish increases in material and energy productivity (R os/Strebel 1979), but this
found a relatively weak echo in economic reality. Heavy industry, strongly represented in the
power structures of the communist countries, resisted rapid structural change, and the price
system gave no real incentive to the required increase in effi iency of material and energy use.
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With the exception of
the GDR (to some extent




terms of the environment
up to the late eighties.
But “dirty” industries
subsequently played a




4. Ecological Modernisation within Industries
For the final possibility for environmentally oriented improvements beyond end-of-pipe
treatment, we will now turn to intrasectoral ecological modernisation. In case studies of the
Japanese, German and Swedish manufacturing sectors we have analysed some of the afore-
mentioned indicators for ecological modernisation, namely the intensity of final energy – es-
pecially electricity – and water consumption. Unfortunately, there were no data available for
other ecologically relevant intensities in individual branches of industry. Since we are inter-
ested in the potential for improvements above and beyond the end-of-pipe approach, we did
not analyse emission intensties.
We were interested in how far inter- and intrasectoral change contributed to the reduction
in ecologically important intensities within the manufacturing sector after 1970, and how far
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this effect was neutralised by industrial growth. In the manufacturing sectors of Japan, Ger-
many and Sweden, intrasectoral ecological modernisation contributed more to (relative) envi-
ronmental improvement than the intersectoral decline of heavily polluting industries (tab. 2,
for details see Jänicke et al. 1993).
Table 2: Ecological Indicators of Industrial Change:
Effects of Intra-/Intersectoral Change and Economic Growth
Japan West Germany Sweden
intra inter growth intra inter growth intra inter growth
result result result
Energy -58,6% -12,6% +179,7% -30,4% -13,6% +37,2% -27,6% -2,1% +25,2%
+5,7% -14,4% -11,4%
Electricity -34,6% -4,3% +179,7% +2,4% -0,4% +37,2% +10,8% -0,7% +25,2%
+79,2% +46,7% +38,3%
Water -29,5% -8,2% +140,5% -36,9% +0,7% +23,8% n.a.
+61,5% -18,1%
Japan: energy/electricity consumption 1970-89; water consumption 1970-87
Germany: energy/electricity consumption 1970-89; water consumption 1971-87
Sweden: energy/electricity consumption 1973-88
n.a. not available
Read: In 1989 energy consumption by Japanese manufacturing was 58.6% lower than it would have been with-
out intrasectoral change since 1970, i.e. without changing energy intensities in individual branches of industry.
"intrasectoral change" means changes in the environmental intensities (environmental consumption per unit of
value added) of individual industries (sectors).
"intersectoral change" means a change in the composition of value added of manufacturing by industries (sec-
tors). If environmentally highly intensive industries are growing slower than average, the effect of intersectoral
change on environmental consumption is negative.
"growth" means growth of manufacturing's combined value added.
"result" means change in the combined environmental consumption of manufacturing.
In 1989 Japan’s industrial final energy consumption was 58.6% (in Germany 30.4%) lower
than it would have been without the technological changes within sectors of industry (intra-
sectoral change) since 1970. By contrast, a reduction in the importance of energy-intensive
sectors (intersectoral change) reduced energy consumption by only about 13% in Japan and
Germany. The corresponding figures for Sweden (1988) show a 27.6% reduction due to intra-
sectoral change, and one of only 2.1% due to intersectoral change since 1973. In spite of the
much smaller effects of its own ecological modernisation, Sweden’s final in ustrial energy
consumption fell by 11.4% (1973-1988), whereas Japan’s rose by 5.7% (1970-89), explained
by the striking differences between growth rates in value added: 25.2% in Sweden, but
179.7% in Japan! The overwhelming importance of intrasectoral, as opposed to intersectoral,
change in determining industrial final energy consumption has been corroborated by addi-
tional studies (Binder 1993). One exception to the rule is Luxembourg, where the radical de-
cline in crude steel production, brought about by concerted industrial policy initiatives, was
more environmentally significant than any technological change (Kuckla 1994). In many
poorer countries, for example Portugal, technological change seems even to have made the
environmental situation worse (Jänicke et al. 1993, 1993a; cf. Howarth et al. 1991).
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A more detailed analysis of different primary energy sources would be useful in estimating
the environmental consequences of energy consumption, but we have not done this.  We only
have focused especially on industrial electricity consumption, firstly because electricity con-
sumption patterns differ from energy consumption patterns, and secondly because large energy
losses in power production and transmission mean that electricity consumption is especially
problematic. In nearly every industrial country there was a rise not only in electricity con-
sumption, but also in electricity intensity. Intersectoral change had almost no effect, while
intrasectoral change often led to a substitution of electricity for other energy sources. The
most important deviant case is Japan, where industrial electricity consumption was 34.6%
lower in 1989 than it would have been without intrasectoral change. Japan is also alone in
having had progressive tariffs on industrial electricity consumption since the oil crisis!
Industrial water intensities seem to have been falling in many developed countries, but
there are still few national time series available for this. Long-term German statistics show an
absolute decline in domestic water consumption since as early as the sixties, which has been
entirely the result of intrasectoral change. In Japan, a similar development started in the mid-
seventies, and has led to a stabilisation of domestic water consumption since the early eight-
ies.
Figure 9 shows the extreme case of Japan (1971-87) in some detail, and includes figures on
land use by sectors. The extraordinarily deep structural change against a background of enor-
mous economic growth can be seen from the different growth rates in value added, ranging
from +15% in textiles to +189% in metal products (and others). But change within these sec-













































































tors is even more impressive: in every sector, except the fast-growing metal products sector,
final energy consumption fell. Virtually all other indicators were rising in every sector except
textiles (electricity consumption in basic metal production also fell), but intensity measured
against value added decreased in nearly every case. This intrasectoral ecological modernisa-
tion took on a special importance in the “dirty” industries: in 1987, the chemicals sector con-
sumed 16% less final energy (and only 3% more electricity), 31% more water and 13% more
land, while adding 151% more value compared with 1971.
Further research is needed to show how far such intrasectoral change is the result of tech-
nological innovation (including leaner production methods), and how far it is simply due to
structural change within the sectors, but intrasectoral ecological modernisation has certainly
been important in some advanced countries. In Japan, the radical improvement in energy effi-
ciency since the oil crisis has contributed to the reduction of SO2 emissi ns to an even greater
extent than the widespread installation of desulphurisation equipment (Environment Agency
1993: 171). On the other hand, most of the industrial energy savings here were neutralised by
rapid growth. Again, different industrial growth rates lead to differences in the long-term envi-
ronmental effects of structural or technological change.
Ecological modernisation has thus far mainly taken the form of increases in the efficiency
of energy and water use and in the extent of recycling. As a form of ecological modernisation,
substitution of dangerous materials has played a minor role. And this may be true to an even
greater extent for intensity of land use and transportation in industry. But it is reasonable to
suppose that the scope of ecological modernisation will expand more and more, coming to
influence these ecologically important factors also.
In the long run, an absolute decrease in the material input of production – so-called “de-
materialisation” (Herman 1989, Schmidt-Bleek 1993) – may become the most significant im-
perative. In this case, ecological modernisation would exert a more dramatic influence on the
role of basic industries (eco-restructuring). Hitherto there has been only a decoupling of in-
dustrial growth from material input in such countries as Japan, Germany, Austria and possibly
the US (where the data are insufficient). In Japan, absolute material input remained substan-
tially stable between 1975 and 1985, before increasing again (Environment Agency 1993:
224); in West Germany, a small per capita reduction could even be observed between 1980
and 1990, with a relative increase in the input of biotic materials (Statistisches Bundesamt
1994: 337).
According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines, worldwide per capita consumption of important
materials remained stable between 1970 and 1990 (Rogich 1993). This implies an absolute
increase in material input, but its decoupling from global economic growth, or at any rate a
relative “de-materialisation”. One would assume that the more advanced countries have made
a relatively high contribution here, but much more research is needed in this area.
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5. Conclusion: On the Verge of a New Green Industrial Policy?
We have given thus far a broad (and necessarily approximate) overview of industrial change
in developed countries, focusing on the heaviest polluters in the economy. It has been shown
that there is immense potential for environmental improvement above and beyond end-of-pipe
measures. Without the changes that took place in the wake of the oil crisis, the environmental
situation in the most advanced industrial countries would have been considerably worse, in
spite of impressive investment in clean-up. However, the actual change has resulted nowhere
in absolute and sustained improvements. Even in highly developed countries, neither reloca-
tion of “dirty” industries, nor their general decline, nor ecological modernisation within envi-
ronment-intensive sectors has been a strong enough motor to go beyond a mere delinkage to a
real reduction of the structural environmental impact of industry.
This supports the argument that a green industrial policy is necessary. The argument gains
particular weight when we regard the fact that the most environmentally harmful industries
often cause economic as well as ecological problems. In several industrial countries, coal-
mining and many basic industries are directly subsidised. They generally profit from low
electricity prices which are in turn “subsidised” by higher prices for domestic users. Indeed,
basic industries are still seen by many countries as their industrial backbone. One might al-
most think that they were the main generators of economic wealth. But society – and the
cleaner industrial sectors – pays a high price for them, a price which becomes even higher
when we include the externalised damage costs of heavy polluters.
The ecological and economic crisis within industry may be the main challenge facing a new
green industrial policy, but there are further arguments for a new industrial strategy (cf.
Fischer/Schot 1993, Flavin/Young 1993, Hinterberger/Welfens 1993, Palmer/Simpson 1993,
Baccini/Brunner 1991; Enquete-Kommission 1994):
· In a growing economy, a stable environmental situation can only be realised by permanent,
increasingly radical technological and structural change. Even if the material flow can be
stabilised or reduced, the crucial problem of the accumulation of dangerous stock-piles r-
mains. Scarce waste disposal facilities, soil pollution and the climate problem are strong
indications here. And additive clean-up measures are only a first step: in many respects
their potential will be exhausted in the foreseeable future, and they are of absolutely no use
in handling many urgent problems. Eco-restructuring of, and ecological modernisation
within, heavily polluting industries will be needed as additional strategies for environ-
mental improvement (or at least stabilisation).
· End-of-pipe treatment and simple environmental repair (for example cleaning contami-
nated soil) may well become an intolerable burden to national economies if they are ex-
tended to cover other unsolved problems. Other ecologically relevant cost factors – such as
transportation, land use, insurance, energy, water and other resources – are also set to rise.
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· The coming effects of eco-auditing and eco-balancing may be similarly important. Enter-
prises in more advanced countries now receive relevant information on the environmental
role of their resource inputs, and market competition forces them increasingly to take ac-
count of such information. As a consequence of environmental reporting on enterprises,
there is now a tendency to place pressure for environmental change onto the shoulders of
the supplier: 25% of Norwegian enterprises evaluate their suppliers today according to en-
vironmental criteria (Gothenburg Research Institute 1995: 46). This easy route to a green
image at the expense of suppliers, first taken by trading companies, will mean great eco-
nomic risks for heavy polluters. They could be the losers in this “greening” of the supply
chain. And this is taking place in the context of market-internal pressure for change which
could produce more results than traditional government intervention.
· Environmental as well as fiscal problems will increase the tendency to raise taxes from
environmental stress factors.
If this scenario is realistic, a long-term strategy would be needed especially for the heavily
polluting industries, for economic as much as for environmental reasons. This is not the place
to formulate such a strategy. We would however like to say what a green industrial policy is
not:
· In the first place, it should be clear that it does not focus on the promotion of “eco-
industries”, i.e. the production of additive clean-up equipment. While these measures may
have their own merits, we have been discussing the need for green industrial policies pre-
cisely because of their limitations.
· Green industrial policy is also more than merely the introduction of eco-taxes, or similar
economic instruments. The markets of most “dirty” industries are usually highly imperfect
and politically regulated, mostly because the social and economic consequences of free
trade are considered unacceptable. This creates limitations on the use of economic instru-
ments, despite their importance. Government-led networking, and concerted action from
the relevant groups would be indispensable (Traxler/Unger 1991).
· Thirdly, green industrial policy cannot be a kind of environmental “super-policy”, with
other relevant policy areas – economic, labour, regional, trade or research – mere sub-
categories in environmental policy-making.
· Finally, ecological modernisation also creates losers. Green industrial policy should there-
fore be conceived also in terms of an active and anticipative labour market policy. Ac-
cording to comparative research, environmental policy is most successful within a stable
economy with good labour market conditions (Jänicke 1996, 1992). And so a green indus-
trial policy should take its own social conditions into account.
We need information about the global structural changes taking place. And we need much
more research on the available options for the existing “dirty” industries: Is an intensification
20
of ecological modernisation the best solution? Is it transformation – for example going over
to new materials or products, participation in high-tech waste recycling, enlarging the service
sector? Or is reduction, its effects mitigated through social policy, the optimal strategy?
In any case, if industrial change is inevitable, and especially if economic and ecological cri-
sis is foreseeable as a result, it should be organised sufficiently far in advance and take place
sufficiently gradually, alleviating the social consequences and giving early incentives for the
creation of new types of employment. And here, organised capitalism may still be the better
mode of operation, in comparison to the pure free market model, which abstains strictly from
any kind of industrial policy.
The crucial question will be for how long, and at what ecological and economic cost a de-
veloped national economy can depend on a large environment-intensive sector. A possible
alternative to a green industrial policy certainly exists: ecological and industrial degeneration.
Its consequences can be studied in Eastern Europe and in many older industrial regions.
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